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1 Introduction  
1.1 Topic and research question  
 
The topic for this thesis is conscientious objection to military service as grounds for 
refugee status.  
 
The research question is ‘Under what circumstances may conscientious objection to 
military service be a ground for refugee status?’  
 
This thesis will conduct a critical and comparative analysis of the regulation of 
conscientious objection to military service as grounds for refugee status in the 
Refugee Convention,1 the recommendations from the Office of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in the Handbook on Procedures and 
Criteria for Determining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention (hereinafter the 
Handbook),2 and UNHCR’s Guidelines on International Protection No 10: Claims to 
Refugee Status related to Military Service within the context of art 1(A)2 of the 1951 
Convention (hereinafter the Guidelines on Military Service),3 and EU’s Qualification 
Directive.4  
 
The objective of this thesis is to assess whether these instruments are harmonized in 
their regulation of conscientious objection as grounds for refugee status or whether 
there are any discrepancies between them. To reach this goal, a critical and 
comparative analysis of the abovementioned instruments is essential.  
 
It is a general rule that sovereign States have the right to raise and maintain military 
forces. This rule can be derived from a state’s right to self-defence under both the UN 
																																																								1	Convention	Relating	to	the	Status	of	Refugees	(adopted	28	July	1951,	entered	into	force	22	April	1954)	189	UNTS	137	2	UNHCR,	Handbook	and	Guidelines	on	Procedures	and	Criteria	for	Determining	Refugee	Status	
under	the	1951	Convention	and	the	1967	Protocol	Relating	to	the	Status	of	Refugees,	December	2011,	HCR/1P/4/ENG/REV.	3	3	UNHCR,	Guidelines	on	International	Protection	No	10:	Claims	to	Refugee	Status	related	to	Military	
Service	within	the	context	of	art	1(A)2	of	the	1951	Convention	and/or	the	1967	Protocol	relating	to	
the	Status	of	Refugees,	3	Dec	2013,	HCR/GIP/13/10	Corr.	1,	12	Nov.	2014	4	EC	Directive	2011/95	of	13	December	2011	
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Charter and customary international law.5 It entails a right for the state to require their 
citizens, under certain conditions,6 to undertake compulsory military service. This 
service does not contradict the prohibition of compulsory labour.7  
 
It is undisputed that whether or not to kill another human being is one of the most 
fundamental moral choices a person can make. When participation in military service 
confronts the individual with that possibility, it raises profound questions of 
conscience. The right to require citizens to perform military service may therefore 
come in conflict with the freedom to assert one’s conscience – when there is no 
alternative civil service, a conscientious objector is forced to either participate in the 
violence he is opposed to, or to suffer the sanction for refusing. Hence, refusal to 
serve may be the only way out of his moral dilemma. 
 
Several states exercise a right to prosecute or otherwise punish those who refuse to 
serve – an intrinsic right all states have. Risking prosecution, the conscientious 
objector may have no other choice than to flee his home country and seek protection 
abroad.  
 
The question is whether a deserter or draft evader, in exercising his right to freedom 
of conscience, can base his claim to refugee status in his conscientious objection to 
military service.  
 
As will be illustrated in this thesis, international refugee law recognizes that violation 
of the right to exercise freedom of conscience may give rise to refugee status, 
consequently confirming that the interests of the individual in some cases can 
outweigh the interests of the state.  
 																																																								5See	UN	Charter	art.	51	and	ICJ	case	Military	and	Paramilitary	Activities	in	and	Against	Nicaragua	
(Nicaragua	v	United	states),	paras.	187-201	6	See	Guidelines	para	6:	‘In	general,	for	military	recruitment	and	service	to	be	justified,	it	needs	to	fulfil	certain	criteria:	prescribed	by	law,	implemented	in	a	way	that	is	not	arbitrary	or	discriminatory,	the	functions	and	discipline	of	the	recruits	must	be	based	on	military	needs	and	plans,	and	be	challengeable	in	a	court	of	law’.		7	See	ICCPR	art.	8(3)(2)(ii)	which	makes	an	exception	from	the	prohibition	of	compulsory	labour	for	‘any	service	of	a	military	character	and,	in	countries	where	conscientious	objection	is	recognized,	any	national	service	required	by	law	of	conscientious	objectors’.	See	also	Guidelines	para.	2.4		
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The treatment of conscientious objectors within international refugee law borders on 
many other areas of international public law including human rights law, 
humanitarian law and to some extent international criminal law. Whereas dynamic 
features are common traits of both human rights law and refugee law, the 
conscientious objector also challenges some common perceptions within these areas 
of law. A right to conscientious objection introduces a new dimension to the 
traditional citizen-state relationship by making a state’s decision about national 
security subordinate to the beliefs and convictions of the individual citizen.  
 
1.2 Conscientious objection  
 
1.2.1 Core definitions  
 
Conscientious objection refers to an objection to military service based on an internal 
conviction of what is morally right or wrong.8 The refusal ‘derives from principles 
and reasons of conscience, including profound convictions, arising from religious, 
moral, ethical, humanitarian or similar motives’.9 That is to say, the objector must 
hold a genuine moral conviction – he cannot claim conscientious objection on 
grounds of fear of death or the fact that he thinks war is stupid, ineffective or 
counterproductive. The objector must believe that either a particular war or war in 
general is morally wrong and that participating in war would go against his or her 
conscience.  
 
Conscientious objectors can present themselves as draft evaders who seek to avoid 
upcoming conscription, or as deserters who have abandoned their military posts 
without permission. Deserters and draft evaders acting according to their conscience 
are exhibiting their knowledge about the injustice of war and seek to identify 
themselves as different from the rest by voicing moral objection.10   
 
																																																								8	Cecilia	M.	Bailliet,	‘Assessing	Jus	ad	Bellum	and	Jus	in	Bello	Within	the	Refugee	Status	Determination	Process:	Contemplations	on	Conscientious	Objectors	Seeking	Asylum’,	
Georgetown	Immigration	Law	Journal,	20	(2005-06),	342	9	UN	Commission	on	Human	Rights,	Conscientious	objection	to	military	service,	22	April	1998,	E/CN.4/RES/1998/77,		10	Supra	note	8,	p.340	
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While some countries accept total exemption from service for conscientious 
objectors,11 many countries have introduced alternative civil service for those who 
seek status as a conscientious objector, hereby recognizing the right of the individual 
to refuse to partake in the military due to his personal convictions. Notwithstanding, it 
is not only the availability of alternative service that can affect the question of 
protection for conscientious objectors, but also the nature and duration of this service.  
 
We distinguish between pacifists who object to all use of armed force or participation 
in war in any form (‘total conscientious objectors’), mostly represented by members 
of religious pacifist groups such as Jehovah’s Witnesses or Quakers, and those who 
believe that “the use of force is justified in some circumstances but not in others, and 
that therefore it is necessary to object in those other cases” (‘selective conscientious 
objectors’).12 As will be illustrated in section 3.4, there has been a lack of willingness 
by multiple states to recognize selective objectors as refugees.  
 
The material scope of the term ‘conscientious objection’ has received little attention, 
and unfortunately, as a result, the term appears as a victim of ambiguous use in legal 
writings concerning refugee protection. Evidently, several legal instruments apply a 
broad definition of ‘conscientious objection’ to encompass situations that can be 
somewhat outside the core of a conscientious belief, such as objecting to a military 
action that violates international law or humanitarian law. An objection of this 
character could be linked to a conscientious belief in some manner, but does not 
necessarily reflect an objection linked to a specific violation of a conscientious belief.  
 
The preference of such external assessment is presumably an outcome of the fact that 
many states are hesitant to recognize a broad range of conscientious objectors, partly 
because it can prove difficult to discern whether or not the conviction of the 
individual is a truthful representation of his or her moral beliefs. Furthermore, the 
recognition of conscientious objectors has proven to be a politically sensitive issue. 
One example is the Vietnam War, where over 470 000 Americans applied for 																																																								11See	inter	alia	Prop.	10L	(2011-2012)	where	the	Norwegian	government	announced	that	alternative	service	for	conscientious	objectors	will	end,	meaning	that	conscientious	objectors	will	simply	be	exempted	from	military	service.		12UN	Conscientious	Objection	to	Military	Service,	E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983/30/Rev.1,	1985	(“Eide	and	Mubanga-Chipoya	report”)	para.	21	
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conscientious objector status.13 Amongst the 300 000 who got their claims rejected 
was boxer Muhammad Ali. His rejection was later overturned, as the Supreme Court 
concluded that his objection was indeed founded on the teachings of Islam.14  
 
In this thesis I will argue that, despite possible administrative challenges or political 
reservations, refugee law practitioners should not solely base their assessments on 
external factors. As far as possible, they should include an assessment of the 
objector’s convictions. For the purpose of this thesis I will apply a broad definition of 
“conscientious objection” in order to encompass the various uses of the term in the 
relevant instruments.  
 
1.2.2 Conscientious objection and human rights 
 
In determining refugee protection for conscientious objectors, questions have risen as 
to what extent the ‘right’ to refuse to do military service due to reasons of conscience 
is a recognized human right. This question is, as will be illustrated in section 3.1, 
essential in relation to ‘persecution’ by means of the Refugee Convention.  
 
As of today there is no international human rights instrument that explicitly 
recognizes conscientious objection to military service as a human right.15 Yet, it is 
evident that there is an increasing trend of acknowledging that the right to freedom of 
conscience encompasses a right to conscientious objection. The Human Rights 
Committee (HRC) has come to consider the right to conscientious objection to 
military service as ‘inherent’ to the right to freedom of conscience codified in article 
18(1) of the ICCPR,16 stressing that this is a ‘far reaching and profound right’.17 
 
In regards to refugee protection, Goodwin-Gill, a leading scholar within international 
refugee law, dismisses the need to constitute conscientious objection to military 																																																								13	"Conscientious	Objectors."	Dictionary	of	American	History.	2003.	Retrieved	November	27,	2015	from	Encyclopedia.com:	http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1G2-3401800995.html		14	See	Clay	v.	United	States,	403	U.S.	698,702	(1971)	15	Guy.	S.	Goodwin-Gill	and	Jane	McAdam.	The	Refugee	in	International	Law.	3rd	ed.	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2007),	105	16	See	inter	alia	Atasoy	and	Sarkut	v.	Turkey,	CCPR/C/99/D/1853-1854/2008	or	Jong-nam	Kim	et	
al.	v.	The	Republic	of	Korea	CCPR/C/106/D/1786-2008		17	Human	Rights	Committee	General	Comment	No.	22:	“The	right	to	freedom	of	thought,	conscience	and	religion”	(Art.	18)	CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4	of	30	July	1993	
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service as an independent human right. He points to the UK-case, Sepet, where Lord 
Bingham found it ‘necessary to investigate whether the treatment which the applicants 
reasonably fear would infringe a recognized human right’.18 The Lord answered the 
question in the negative, as the right he wanted but failed to find was the human right 
to conscientious objection, rather than the freedom of conscience itself. According to 
Goodwin-Gill, it is neither correct nor required by the Convention to establish that the 
right to conscientious objection exists as a recognized fundamental human right, 
before it can form the basis for refugee status.19  
 
In conclusion, there is no need to hunt for the “lesser” right of objection to military 
service. The legitimacy of conscientious objection as grounds for asylum does not 
depend on its prior recognition as an individual human right. It is sufficient for the 
applicant to have a well-founded fear of being persecuted for his efforts to assert his 
right to conscience.  
 
1.3 Methodology and Sources  
 
This thesis will conduct an analysis de lege lata of the international instruments 
currently regulating conscientious objection, starting off with scrutiny of the 
authoritative weight of the applicable legal sources.  
 
The sources relevant for determining the refugee status of conscientious objectors to 
military service are mainly the instruments subject to analysis in this thesis. In 
addition, legal writings and case law will serve as contributing factors. The topic of 
refugee status for conscientious objectors is quite modestly covered, and as some of 
the instruments presented in this thesis were published fairly recently, legal scholars 
have yet to conduct a comparative analysis.  
 
Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) identifies the 
generally recognized sources of international law, listing ‘international conventions’, 
‘international custom’ and ‘general principles of law’ as the formal primary sources. 
																																																								18Sepet	v.	Secretary	of	State	for	the	Home	Department,	[2003]	UKHL	15,	para.	9	19Supra	note	15,	p.114	
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In addition, judicial decisions and teachings are recognized as secondary sources of 
international law.  
 
The Refugee Convention, which was drawn up as a post-WWII legal framework 
binding upon the parties to it, constitutes a primary source of international law. 
Hence, the Refugee Convention will be interpreted in accordance with the general 
principles for interpretation of international treaties found in VCLT Article 31(1).20 
Article 31(1) provides that conventions ‘shall be interpreted in good faith in 
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their 
context and in the light of its object and purpose’.  
 
As for EU’s Qualification Directive, a ‘directive’ is a legislative act that sets out aims 
that must be achieved by the Member States, often in the forms of minimum 
standards.21 The Court of Justice of the European Union’s (CJEU) approach to 
interpretation of Community law derives from the principles of the VCLT.  In 
addition the ‘spirit, the general scheme and the wording’ have to be taken into 
account,22 opening for a more teleological approach.  
 
The methodology recognized in public international law will be applied, more 
specifically, the ‘soft positivist’ approach. This theory of international law recognizes 
the need for other sources, in addition to the formal sources of international law, as a 
result of the growing importance of other actors than states.23   
 
1.3.1 The Handbook and Guidelines as soft law instruments    
 
Seeing as neither the UNHCR’s Handbook nor Guidelines fall under any of the 
sources of international law listed in article 38, they are regarded as ‘soft law’ 
instruments.  
 
																																																								20	The	1969	Vienna	Convention	on	the	Law	of	Treaties		
21	Nigel	Foster,	Foster	on	EU	Law.	4th	ed.	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2013),	99	22	Van	Gend	en	Loos	v.	Netherlands	Inland	Revenue	Administration,	Case	26/62			[1963]	23	Bruno	Simma	and	Andreas	Paulus,	‘The	Responsibility	of	Individuals	for	Human	Rights	Abuses	in	Internal	Conflicts:	A	Positivist	View’,	American	Journal	of	International	Law,	3	(1999),	306	
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While there is no generally accepted definition of the term ‘soft law’, it can be said to 
represent a form of non-binding normative framework in which existing norms from 
other sources are consolidated within a single document.24  
 
In the dynamic area that is refugee law, an advantage with soft law instruments is that 
they are flexible and often easier to amend than binding treaties. Furthermore, their 
non-binding form can make it easier to reach agreement between States, hence soft 
law can be effective when no agreement on a treaty is possible (which in international 
refugee law often is due to sovereignty concerns). Thus, soft law can progressively 
provide clear and authoritative guidelines in given areas, without the need to negotiate 
and unanimously agree on new binding norms. 
 
Despite the possibility of the UNHCR’s Handbook and Guidelines providing 
authoritative guidance to states, their non-binding nature implies that States have no 
obligations to implement the norms found in these instruments. Yet, they fill 
important gaps that were left in the wake of the vague Refugee Convention, leading 
states to seek guidance in them in inter alia questions of protection for conscientious 
objectors. The ‘soft positivist’ approach stresses that ‘soft law is an important device 
for the attribution of meaning to rules and for the perception of legal change’.25  
 
As will be illustrated in the following, both the Handbook and the Guidelines are used 
as instruments for the interpretation of the Refugee Convention as a primary source. 
Article 32 of the VCLT provides for such supplementary means of interpretation only 
when the treaty’s meaning cannot be discerned by applying the rules set out in article 
31.  
 
1.4 Overview of thesis  
 
The thesis elaborates on the instruments in refugee law regulating conscientious 
objection through a brief presentation and a discussion on their authoritative weight 
(section 2). Then follows a comparison of the instruments with the conditions set out 																																																								24	Alexander	Betts,	‘Towards	a	‘Soft	Law’	Framework	for	the	Protection	of	Vulnerable	Irregular	Migrants’,	International	Journal	of	Refugee	Law	22,	no.2	(2010),	223.		25	Supra	note	23,	p.308		
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in the Refugee Convention as a starting point (section 3), starting with the 
requirement of a human rights violation amounting to persecution (section 3.1). 
Special attention is paid to the Convention ground ‘political opinion’ (section 3.4) and 
the problematic tendency to apply paragraph 171 of the Handbook in order to reject 
the claims of conscientious objectors, before moving on to two central topics of 
discussion (section 4) necessary to provide concluding reflections on the refugee 
status for conscientious objectors (section 5).  
 
2 An introduction to and analysis of the sources in 
international refugee law regulating conscientious 
objection    
 
In order to conduct a comparative analysis of the applicable sources in section 3, it is 
necessary to further explore the authoritative weight of the different sources, as well 
as the relationships between them. A natural starting point for any discussion on 
refugee status is the Refugee Convention.   
 
2.1 The Refugee Convention  	
The Refugee Convention is an important human rights instrument. This is confirmed 
by the reference to the UDHR and the UN Charter in its Preamble.26 Historically the 
objective of the Convention was to prevent refugees who had lost the protection of 
their State of origin from becoming legal non-persons without the opportunity to 
exercise their rights and freedoms.27 Accordingly, the Refugee Convention may be 
viewed as one of the first human rights treaties securing the rights for an especially 
vulnerable group of persons, namely refugees.28  
 
According to article 1A(2), which provides the principle basis for establishing a 
person’s refugee status, the term ‘refugee’ applies to any person who  
 																																																								26	See	Recital	1		27	Andreas	Zimmermann,	Ed.	The	1951	Convention	Relating	to	the	Status	of	Refugees	and	its	1967	
Protocol	-	A	Commentary.	(Oxford:	Oxford	University	Press,	2011),	232	28	Ibid.	p.233	
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‘…owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, 
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside 
the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to 
avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and 
being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, 
is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.’ 
 
When determining whether an individual is a refugee, the States Party to the 
Convention are bound by the criteria set out here. Refugee status does not arise as the 
result of a formal recognition by UNHCR or a State authority; refugee status is 
achieved as soon as the definition in article 1A(2) is fulfilled. 29  The refugee 
definition, like human rights instruments in general, is part of a living instrument and 
hence must be interpreted both in the light of developments in international law since 
its adoption in 1951, as well as change in global circumstances.30 Today, over 60 
years later, it still serves as the primary instrument for the protection of refugees 
worldwide.   
 
This refugee definition was deliberately kept brief and simple. Its lack of detail, whilst 
ensuring needed flexibility, has left it up to each contracting State to further define its 
terms, causing considerable variations. The legal instruments explored in this thesis 
all seek to add more detail to this definition. It is noteworthy that the ICJ is competent 
to rule on disputes concerning the content of the Refugee Convention,31 but it has 
never been called upon to do so, as only states, not individuals or organizations, can 
bring cases before it.32  
 
The Convention provides little further guidance on the question of protection for 
conscientious objectors. Yet, if we apply the contextual interpretation provided in 
VCLT article 31 and look to the exclusion clause in article 1F of the Refugee 
Convention, this gives us a starting point. Article 1F excludes perpetrators of inter 
alia crimes against peace and war crimes from protection under the Convention. It 
would be a contradiction if a person was not given the possibility, through seeking 																																																								29	Confirmed	in	‘the	Handbook’	para.	28	30	Supra	note	27,	p.299	31	Cf.	article	38	32	See	article	34(1)	Statute	of	the	ICJ		
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protection as a conscientious objector, to avoid taking part in acts that would lead to 
exclusion. If not, he may be forced to participate in atrocities that will later exclude 
him from refugee protection. This implies that the international community should 
provide protection for those who object to taking part in war crimes and crimes 
against peace. Yet, exclusively operating with a link to the exclusion clause as a 
condition for protection sets a high threshold, as will be illustrated through the 
comparison of the Refugee Convention and EU’s Qualification Directive.  
 
2.2 UNCHR’s Handbook  
 
Lacking an international court to provide authoritative statements on the content and 
interpretation of the Refugee Convention, practitioners were left with many 
unanswered questions. Member States of UNHCR’s Executive Committee therefore 
explicitly requested the UNHCR to ‘consider the possibility of issuing - for the 
guidance of Governments - a handbook relating to procedures and criteria for 
determining refugee status’.33  
 
As a result the UNHCR published the Handbook in 1979.34 In addition to providing a 
clause-by-clause interpretation of the refugee definition, it includes guidance on 
special cases such as conscientious objection. According to its foreword, the objective 
of the Handbook is to ‘guide government officials, judges, practitioners, as well as 
UNHCR staff applying the refugee definition’, inter alia in hope that this will ‘help 
resolve variations in interpretation’. 
 
UNHCR’s Handbook has an entire section devoted to ‘Deserters and other persons 
avoiding military service’,35 confirming that desertion or draft evasion ‘does not […] 
exclude a person from being a refugee’. 36  In paragraph 170 the Handbook 
acknowledges that ‘valid reasons of conscience’ can be the ‘sole ground for a claim to 																																																								33	UN	High	Commissioner	for	Refugees	(UNHCR),	Determination	of	Refugee	Status,	12	October	1977,	No.	8	(XXVIII)	-	1977,	para.	g),	available	at:	http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae68c6e4.html	[accessed	15	September	2015]	34	The	Handbook	was	re-issued	in	2011	-	Handbook	and	Guidelines	on	Procedures	and	Criteria	for	
Determining	Refugee	Status	under	the	1951	Convention	and	the	1967	Protocol	Relating	to	the	
Status	of	Refugees,	December	2011,	HCR/1P/4/ENG/REV.	3 35	Paras.	167-174	36	Para.	167	
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refugee status’. It further opens for protection were the deserter or draft evader faces 
disproportionately sever or discriminatory punishment.37 Throughout this thesis the 
content of this section and the interrelationships between its paragraphs will be further 
explored. 
 
The Handbook has been introduced as a soft law instrument, but as debated by 
scholars, the question of its authoritative weight remains somewhat unclear.38 
 
State practice clearly shows a lack of uniformity regarding the status of the 
Handbook. In Sepet, it was described as ‘an important source of guidance’,39 while 
Canadian courts have regarded the Handbook as having ‘highly persuasive 
authority’.40 The Norwegian Supreme Court has gone from deeming the status of the 
Handbook ‘unnecessary’ to explore further, 41  to stating that ‘considerable 
significance’ should be attached to it.42 Still, scholars have questioned its authoritative 
status by highlighting that ‘it remains true, at least in Australian courts, that […] 
greater weight is generally accorded to the decisions of other common law courts and 
learned commentators’.43  
 
Courts have claimed that taking into account UNHCR’s positions falls under the 
States Parties duties to co-operate with the UNHCR under article 35 of the Refugee 
Convention. According to its Statute the UNHCR has a generally worded 
responsibility of supervising the application of the Convention’s provisions and 
proposing amendments thereto. 44 This has been taken as a sign that the States agree 
that UNHCR’s positions should not be dismissed as irrelevant, but regarded as 
authoritative statements whose disregard requires justification. 45  According to 																																																								37	Para.	169	38	Satvinder	Singh	Juss,	ed.	Contemporary	Issues	in	Refugee	Law	(Cheltenham:	Edward	Elgar,	2013),	38	39	Supra	note	18,	para.	12		40	Chan	v	Canada	[1995]	3	SCR	395	(Canada)	p.620		41Rt-1991-586,	p.539		42Rt-2012-139,	para	50	43	Anthony	M.	North	and	Joyce	Chia	“Towards	convergence	in	the	interpretation	of	the	Refugee	Convention:	A	proposal	of	the	establishment	of	an	International	Judicial	Commission	for	Refugees”	in	The	UNHCR	and	the	Supervision	of	International	Refugee	Law,	ed.	J.	Simeon	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2013),	236	44	UNGA	Res	428(V)	(14	December	1950),		Subpara.	8	a)	45	Walter	Kälin,	“Supervising	the	1951	Convention	Relating	to	the	Status	of	Refugees:	Article	35	and	beyond”	in	Refugee	Protection	in	International	Law	-	UNHCR's	global	consultations	on	
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Einarsen, the fact that it was UNHCR’s Executive Committee that initiated the 
process strengthens the Handbook’s authoritative status.46  
 
Still, the UNHCR has been reluctant to portray the Handbook as more of a definite 
guide, stating that they are ‘fully aware of the shortcomings’ and that it is ‘not 
possible to encompass every situation in which a person may apply for refugee 
status’.47 This may cause ambiguity as to whether the rules must be taken into account 
or if they can be ignored at a state’s convenience. Stressing its non-exhaustive 
character might seem appropriate in a dynamic field like refugee law, but one might 
also argue that this explicit statement has limited the willingness to view the 
Handbook as an authoritative text.   
 
In conclusion, despite the fact that it was written at the request of Member States, 
practice clearly shows that the authority of the Handbook is not unequivocally 
accepted. At best, the Handbook can be said to have persuasive authority, cf. the 
abovementioned case law. Undoubtedly, the objective of the Handbook, to ‘provide 
an important reference’ is still met. It clearly supplements and elucidates the Refugee 
Convention by elaborating on the criteria for determining refugee status through 
addressing emerging issues such as conscientious objection.  
 
In the end, regardless of its status, positions such as the Handbook might just be one 
of the most influential means for the UNCHR to contribute to the development of 
international refugee law. As we shall see, it is frequently cited by courts in relation to 
questions of conscientious objection.  
 
2.3 UNHCR’s Guidelines on Military Service  
 
In 2000 the UNHCR convened the Global Consultations on International Protection 
with a goal of achieving greater clarity and coherence in interpretation of the Refugee 
Convention. As Volker Türk, Director of International Protection at UNHCR noted, 																																																																																																																																																														
international	protection	ed.	Erika	Feller	et.	al	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2003),	627	46	Terje	Einarsen,	Retten	til	vern	som	flyktning	(Bergen:	Cicero	Publisher,	2000),	75		47	Para.	221	
	 17	
the purpose of the consultations was to ‘take stock of the state of law and practice 
[…], to consolidate the various positions taken and to develop concrete 
recommendations […] to achieve more consistent understandings of these various 
interpretive issues’.48  Ultimately, the UNHCR recognized that since issuing the 
Handbook, further clarifications were needed.  
 
Following these consultations, UNHCR started issuing Guidelines on International 
Protection, pursuant to UNHCR’s abovementioned supervisory role.49 In 2013, the 
UNHCR published its tenth set of Guidelines, the Guidelines on Military Service. In 
light of the diverging developments in the practice of States, these Guidelines aim to 
‘facilitate a consistent and principled application of the refugee definition’.50 In his 
introductory note to the guidelines, Türk proclaims that they intend to ‘explain the 
legal framework for the determination of claims to refugee status of those seeking to 
avoid military service – whether for reasons of conscience, or because of other 
reasons’.51  
 
It has been established that the Handbook has persuasive authority, but is not 
unequivocally accepted. What about the Guidelines?   
 
Considering that the Guidelines on Military Service were published as recently as in 
2013 it has proven a challenge to determine how and to what extent legal advisors 
have applied them. Despite their short life span these Guidelines have been the 
subject of criticism, particularly from Goodwin-Gill.   
 
In a note to the Guidelines on Military Service from 2015, Türk and Edwards, both 
employed at the UNHCR, stress that the Guidelines ‘provide a legal authoritative 
interpretation’ of article 1(A)2.52 This introductory note was published in reply to 																																																								48	Volker	Türk,	‘Introductory	Note	to	UNHCR	Guidelines	on	International	Protection’,	
International	Journal	of	Refugee	Law	15	(2003),	303	49	Erika	Feller,	Volker	Türk	and	Frances	Nicholson	eds.,	Refugee	Protection	in	International	Law:	
UNHCR’s	Global	Consultations	on	International	Protection	(Cambridge,	Cambridge	University	Press,	2003),	9	50	‘The	Guidelines	on	Military	Service’,	para.	1		51	Volker	Türk	and	Alice	Edwards,	‘Introductory	Note	to	Guidelines	on	International	Protection	No.	10	on	Claims	to	Refugee	Status	related	to	Military	Service’,	International	Journal	of	Refugee	
Law	27	(2015),	167	52Ibid.	p.166	
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Goodwin-Gill stating that the Guidelines on Military Service were ‘a work in 
progress’, illustrating several examples of ‘basic errors of citation, substance and 
presentation’.53 He expressed that ‘if the guidelines are to be treated as authoritative 
[…] then the methodology needs very careful consideration’,54 a clear indication that 
Goodwin-Gill finds that the methodology is not satisfactory. Not only does he point 
out several examples where the Guidelines cite wrong sources, he also stresses that 
the UNHCR needs to ‘recognize and closely analyse and understand […] the 
reasoning and approaches of national and international courts’. 55  He therefore 
criticizes the lack of practitioners in the drafting process.56 Türk responds that 
consultations were held with ‘many stakeholders’, including ‘academics […] relevant 
international organizations’ and ‘UNHCR staff’.57 It is a word against word situation.    
 
In a subsequent article examining whether the eleven Guidelines reflect a global 
character, Bailliet finds a clear bias in favour of citation of common law jurisdictions, 
and no citations from the developing world.58 In relation to the Guidelines on Military 
Service she notes that in addition to citations from the European Court of Human 
Rights (ECtHR), only two UK cases are cited. No other national jurisprudence is 
mentioned. The Guidelines do mention article 9(2)(e) of the Qualification Directive, 
but only briefly in a footnote.  These findings are certainly not in correspondence with 
Türk’s proclamation of the purpose of the Guidelines: ‘taking stock of the state of law 
and practice […] to achieve more consistent understandings’.59 
 
In my opinion, the findings are rather alarming. I must agree with Bailliet that as long 
as the Guidelines mostly cite common law cases and have no references to cases from 
the developing world, they cannot be said to reflect universal standards. This lack of 
universality removes the Guidelines from its de lege lata goal, indicating a lower 
authoritative weight than sought out by the UNHCR.  																																																								53	Guy	S	Goodwin-Gill,	‘The	Dynamic	of	International	Refugee	Law’,	International	Journal	of	
Refugee	Law	25	(2014),	658	54Ibid.	p.657	55Ibid.	pp.657-659	56Ibid.	p.658	57Supra	note	51,	p.	171	58	Cecilia	M.	Bailliet,	‘National	Case	Law	as	a	Generator	of	International	Refugee	Law:	Rectifying	an	Imbalance	Within	UNHCR	Guidelines	on	International	Protection’,	Emory	International	Law	
Review	29	(2015),	2063	59Supra	note	48	
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2.4 EU’s Qualification Directive  
 
When adopted in April 2004, as an important factor in the work towards a Common 
European Asylum System (CEAS), the Qualification Directive 60  was the first 
supranational instrument binding on EU Member States, 61  outlining ‘minimum 
standards’ for who should receive ‘international protection’.62  The Directive was 
recast in 2011 in order ‘to address the deficiencies identified […] and to ensure higher 
and more harmonized standards of protection’.63 In the following, when referring to 
the Qualification Directive, I refer to the recast Directive.64  
 
Article 9(2) of the Qualification Directive provides a non-exhaustive list65 of acts 
amounting to persecution ‘within the meaning of Article 1A of the Geneva 
Convention’.  
 
That Member States and EU institutions are bound to comply with international law 
on asylum when they adopt or apply EU asylum law is apparent from the principle of 
pacta sunt servanda - that states must keep to their agreements.66 And indeed, the 
Qualification Directive expresses that it is ‘based on the full and inclusive 
application’ of the Refugee Convention.67 Evidently the objective of the Directive has 
not been to substitute the refugee definition, but to provide interpretive guidance to a 
vague definition and to ‘guide the competent national bodies of Member States in the 
application of the Geneva Convention’.68 
 
Yet, several actors have questioned whether the Qualification Directive actually 
respects the Refugee Convention to the degree that is claimed in the recitals. ECRE 
(European Council on Refugees and Exiles) and the UNHCR have stated that parts of 																																																								60	EC	Directive	2004/83	of	29	April	2004	61	Except	for	Great	Britain,	Ireland	and	Denmark,	ibid.	Recital	50-52	62	‘international	protection’	introduces	‘subsidiary	protection’	for	those	who	fall	outside	the	provisions	of	the	Convention	63	COM	(2009)	551	final	-	2009/0164	(COD),	p.5		64	EC	Directive	2011/95	of	13	December	2011	65	Cf.	‘inter	alia’	66Hemme	Battjes,	European	asylum	law	and	international	law	(Leiden:	M.	Nijhoff,	2006),	59	67	Recital	5			68	Recital	23		
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the Directive does not ‘adequately reflect the 1951 Refugee Convention’.69 This view 
is clearly mirrored throughout UNCHR’s Annotated Comments,70 as well as by 
several legal scholars.71 It should be noted that Directive makes no mention of any of 
UNHCR’s recommendations.  
 
According to article 9(2)(e) ‘prosecution or punishment for refusal to perform 
military service in a conflict, where performing military service would include crimes 
or acts falling within the scope of the grounds for exclusion as set out in Article 
12(2)’ can amount to an act of persecution within the meaning of the Refugee 
Convention. The grounds for exclusion in article 12(2) include crimes against peace, 
war crimes, crimes against humanity, serious non-political crimes and acts contrary to 
the purposes and principles of the UN.  
 
In other words, the Qualification Directive limits refugee status to extreme 
circumstances where the individual would be required to commit war crimes or other 
serious crimes as part of their military service. This limitation clearly goes against the 
views of UNHCR on granting refugee status where military service is contrary to 
‘genuine political, religious or moral convictions or to valid reasons of conscience’.72   
 
2.5 Conclusion  
 
There are elements in the abovementioned instruments that may lead us to question 
their authoritative weight. If a legal practitioner is faced with a question of which 
interpretative guide to apply (provided that he is bound by the Qualification 
Directive), he might take into consideration the legal authority of the applicable 
instruments. As will be illustrated in the following, which instrument is chosen may 
be essential to whether or not protection is provided to the conscientious objector.  
 
																																																								69	Comments	from	the	European	Council	on	Refugees	and	Exiles	on	the	European	Commission	
Proposal	to	recast	the	Qualification	Directive,	p.	3	available	at:	http://www.ecre.org/topics/areas-of-work/protection-in-europe/148.html	70	UNHCR	Annotated	Comments	on	the	EC	Council	Directive	2004/83/EC	of	29	April	2004,	28	January	2005	71	See	inter	alia	Hugo	Storey,	‘EU	Refugee	Qualification	Directive:	A	Brave	New	World’	
International	Journal	of	Refugee	Law	20	(2008),	7-13			72	See	‘Handbook’,	para.	170	
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3 A comparative analysis of conscientious objection as a 
ground for refugee status in UNHCR’s recommendations 
and in the EU Qualification Directive  
 
Will a deserter or draft evader who objects to military service for valid reasons of 
conscience receive protection under the Refugee Convention? The answer to whether 
or not the objector has a legitimate claim to refugee status can only be found by 
examining the Convention itself with interpretative guidance from the Qualification 
Directive and UNHCR’s Handbook and Guidelines.  
 
The following sections will therefore explore some of the major differences between 
the Qualification Directive and UNCHR’s Handbook and Guidelines, using the 
Refugee Convention and ‘a well-founded fear of persecution’, the core of the refugee 
definition, as the starting point.  
 
3.1  Persecution   
 
To fall within the refugee definition in article 1(A)2 of the Refugee Convention, the 
objector has to have a well-founded fear of ‘being persecuted’.   
 
Even though persecution is the key element in determining refugee status, the term is 
not defined in the Convention or in any other international instrument. Yet, as shown 
in section 2.4, the Qualification Directive has made the biggest attempt at specifying 
the term by providing a non-exhaustive list of acts of persecution.  
 
The ordinary meaning of ‘persecuted’, interpreted in light of the object and purpose of 
article 1(A)2, suggests that there must be a sufficiently severe violation of human 
rights.  
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The connection to human rights is confirmed in the travaux préparatoires stating that 
‘any meaning that has to be given to the concept of persecution must take into account 
the existing general human rights standards’.73  
 
This human rights approach is further upheld in the Qualification Directive’s 
definition of an act of persecution in article 9(1) as a severe violation of ‘basic human 
rights’. The Directive does not define the term ‘basic’ human rights. Yet in 
referencing the non-derogable rights in Article 15(2) of the European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR), article 9(1) indicates that right to life, prohibition from 
torture and slavery and the right to no punishment without law, are rights that ‘in 
particular’ constitute ‘basic’ rights.  
 
In connecting persecution to the constantly evolving human rights, we make sure that 
the persecutory acts evolve in line with this area of law, thus ensuring a dynamic 
refugee law. Still, it is clear that the drafters of the Qualification Directive and the 
Refugee Convention did not intend to include every violation of human rights.   
 
According to Goodwin-Gill, whether an act amounts to persecution requires an 
assessment of complex factors such as the nature of the freedom threatened, the 
nature and the severity of the restriction and the likelihood of the restriction 
eventuating in the specific case.74 The Qualification Directive has reaffirmed that the 
nature and severity has to be taken into account.75  
 
The following subsection will explore the material scope of persecution and nature 
and severity of the freedom threatened more specifically related to conscientious 
objection. 
 
 
																																																								73	UNHCR,	The	Refugee	Convention,	1951:	The	Travaux	préparatoires	analysed	with	a	Commentary	
by	Dr.	Paul	Weis,	1990,	available	at:	http://www.refworld.org/docid/53e1dd114.html	[accessed	14	October	2015]	74	Supra	note	15,	p.92	75	Article	9(1)	states	that	the	persecution	‘must	be	sufficiently	serious	by	their	nature	or	repetition	as	to	constitute	a	severe	violation’		
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3.1.1 Can service in the military in itself constitute persecution within the 
meaning of article 1(A)2?  
 
As illustrated above, whether or not an act amounts to persecution depends on the 
nature and severity of the freedom threatened.  
 
As a matter of principle, any human rights violation may lead to refugee status.76 Yet, 
as illustrated by the Directive’s referral to non-derogable rights, certain human rights 
are of such nature that they more easily substantiate a refugee claim. As established in 
section 1.2.2, conscientious objection to military service is yet to be recognized as an 
independent human right. Still, it is evident that being forced to bear arms against 
one’s conscience can amount to a violation of the right to freedom of conscience 
provided by article 18(1) of the ICCPR.  
 
The question is whether or not freedom of conscience is of a sufficiently qualified 
nature.  
 
Article 4(2) of the ICCPR states that article 18(1) cannot be derogated from, even in 
time of public emergency. This indicates that freedom of conscience is of a 
fundamental character. The fundamental nature of the freedom of conscience might 
suggest that any measure connected with the military service compelling an individual 
to act contrary to his or her sincerely held belief, amounts to persecution. That service 
in itself can amount to persecution is supported by the Handbook stating that 
‘performance’ in military service may be a ground for claiming refugee status.77 In 
addition, the Guidelines reaffirm that ‘conscription’ may amount to persecution.78 
 
As a starting point, there is no indication that the Refugee Convention and the 
Qualification Directive don’t express the same views on the freedom of conscience 
being of a sufficiently qualified nature. Still, it has been implied by Goodwin-Gill that 
when applying this human rights approach, it should be taken into consideration 
whether or not the right in question is absolute.79   																																																								76	Supra	note	27,	p.354	77	‘Handbook’,	para.	170		78	‘Guidelines	on	Military	Service’,	para.	17	79	Supra	note	15,	p.103	
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There are different views on whether a right to conscientious objection inherent to the 
freedom of conscience is absolute or if this right can be subject to limitations.  
 
ICCPR article 18(3) opens for limitations in the freedom to manifest one’s conscience 
provided that the limitations are ‘prescribed by law’ and are ‘necessary’ to ‘protect 
public safety’. Provided that the three cumulative requirements are met, a state could 
justify limitations in the freedom of conscience, and hence justify the application of a 
law on compulsory military service. In stating that the restrictions in 18(3) ‘must not 
impair the very essence of the right in question’,80 the UN Human Rights Committee 
sets a high threshold for limiting the right of freedom of conscience, giving it the 
character of an absolute right. This development is confirmed in the Guidelines.81  
  
The ECtHR on the other hand has been hesitant in treating conscientious objection to 
military service as an absolute right. In Bayatyan82 the Court expressed that the 
limitations in article 9(2) of the ECHR (reflecting ICCPR article 18(3)), could be 
applied provided that such interference was ‘prescribed by law’ and ‘necessary in a 
democratic society’.83 In other words, within the European context states retain a 
margin of appreciation in deciding whether and to what extent interference in the 
freedom of conscience is ‘necessary’ in cases of conscientious objection. In not 
viewing the freedom of conscience as an absolute right, European States therefore 
have more room to argue that the freedom violated is not of a sufficient nature.84  
 
Even though a violation of freedom of conscience due to military service, in principle, 
may lead to refugee status, the severity of the violation is of crucial importance.  
 
As for the required severity of the human rights violation, neither the wording of 
article 1(A)2 or its object and purpose provide clear answers. The Qualification 
Directive has sought clarification by stating that the relevant act must be ‘sufficiently 
																																																								80	Yeo-Bum	Yoon	&	Myung-Jin	Choi	v.	Republic	of	Korea,	CCPR/C/88/D/1321-1322/2004,	para.	8.3	81	‘Guidelines	on	Military	Service’,	para.	10	82	Bayatyan	v.	Armenia	(GC)	(Application	no.	23459/03),	para	110	83	Ibid.	para	112	84	Confirmed	by	Goodwin-Gill,	supra	note	53,	p.660	
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serious by their nature or repetition’ as to constitute a ‘severe’ violation of basic 
human rights. 85  To determine whether the violation is ‘severe’, the CJEU has 
expressed that account must be taken of the ‘intrinsic severity as well as the severity 
of [the] consequences’ of the acts concerned, including the ‘measures and sanctions 
adopted’ against the applicant.86  
 
This raises the following question - when a person is compelled to do military service 
contrary to his sincerely held belief, at what point, if ever, is his freedom of 
conscience violated in such a severe way that the service in itself amounts to 
persecution?  
 
The answer relies on a case-by-case assessment where inter alia the intensity of the 
acts and their duration are important factors.87 This indicates that the longer the 
military service, the more likely it is to be found a ‘severe’ violation of the freedom of 
conscience.  
 
Whether military service amounts to persecution within these instruments also 
depends on the availability of alternative service. If the objector does not avail 
himself to an available alternative service that is compatible with his reasons for 
objection and not of a punitive nature, he will not be heard with a claim of persecution 
on grounds of violation of freedom of conscience.  
 
In conclusion, when finding that there is a sufficiently severe violation of freedom of 
conscience, States are free to recognize conscientious objection to military service in 
itself as a sufficient ground for refugee status. As literature and case law have yet to 
address this issue, it is difficult to conclude on the threshold for granting protection 
for conscientious objectors on these grounds. Moreover it is challenging to provide a 
definite answer to whether or not the possibility of limitations actually raises the 
threshold in the Qualification Directive.   
 
																																																								85	Art.	9(1)(a)	86Joined	cases	C-71/11	and	C-99/11,	Bundesrepublik	Deutschland	v	Y	and	Z,	[2012],	paras.	65-6		87	As	indicated	by	‘nature	or	repetition’	in	article	9(1)	of	the	Directive.		
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3.1.2 Can punishment or prosecution of a conscientious objector amount to 
persecution?  
 
When claiming a well-founded fear of ‘being persecuted’, conscientious objectors 
most often base their claims on fear of prosecution or other forms of punishment. As 
shown in section 1.1, desertion or draft-evasion is often considered a criminal offense 
resulting in prosecution or punishment. This leads us to the question of when such 
prosecution or punishment amounts to persecution within the meaning of the Refugee 
Convention.  
 
The undisputed starting point is that punishment or prosecution for desertion or draft 
evasion does not amount to prosecution for the purpose of article 1(A)2. The 
argument is that the government is merely enforcing a law of general application; 
hence there is no nexus between the punishment and one of the Convention grounds.88 
For conscientious objectors this is explicitly confirmed by UNHCR’s Handbook 
stating that ‘fear of prosecution and punishment for desertion or draft evasion does 
not, in itself, constitute well-founded fear of persecution under the definition’.89 
 
To regard all prosecution as persecution would infringe on the State’s right to regulate 
their own governance through a system of law. The objective of the Convention is not 
to assist fugitives from justice. Hence, persons fleeing from what must be perceived 
as lawful punishment are not normally refugees.90 As a result, applications for refugee 
status will often be denied on the grounds that the applicant is not in fear of 
persecution, but prosecution under a law of general application, in our case a law on 
conscription.   
 
Yet, there are exceptions where prosecution or punishment may amount to 
persecution within the meaning of article 1(A)2.  
 
Relevant requirements are presented in UNHCR’s recommendations, acknowledging 
that ‘disproportionate or arbitrary punishment’ 91  or ‘disproportionately severe 																																																								88	’Handbook’	para.	169	89Ibid.	para.	167	90Ibid.	para.	56	91	‘Guidelines	on	Military	Service’,	para.	18	
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punishment’ 92  of a conscientious objector may amount to persecution. This is 
mirrored by the wording ‘disproportionate or discriminatory’ in article 9(2)(c) and (d) 
of the Directive, which after a contextual approach also applies to punishment or 
prosecution of conscientious objectors after 9(2)(e).  
 
Again, whether punishment or prosecution of the objector amounts to persecution 
must be determined on a case-by-case basis. According to Goodwin-Gill this 
assessment will depend on the object and purpose of the law, the precise motivation 
of the individual who breaches such law, the “interest” which such individual asserts 
and the nature and extent of the punishment.93  
 
As Goodwin-Gill notes, ‘disproportionate punishment cannot turn a non-Convention 
persecution into a Convention persecution’.94 Even if a disproportionate punishment 
of a conscientious objector is presumed to be discriminatory, there must, as section 
3.3 will illustrate, be a link to one of the Convention grounds.  
 
In other words, in order to be granted protection, a conscientious objector also has to 
meet the additional requirements set out in article 1(A)2.  
 
3.2  ‘well-founded fear’  
 
To qualify for refugee status under the Refugee Convention, the objector needs to 
demonstrate a ‘well-founded fear’ of being persecuted.   
 
The wording ‘well-founded’ suggests that the objector can be granted protection only 
in situations where the respective risk level is conceived high enough.  
 
The Refugee Convention does not address the question of what degree of risk is 
necessary in order to determine the existence of a ‘well-founded’ fear. According to 
the Handbook, the applicant must establish a ‘reasonable degree’ of likelihood that 
continued stay in his or her country of origin would have lead/would lead to renewed 																																																								92	‘Handbook’	para.	169	93Supra	note	15,	p.115	94Ibid.	
	 28	
persecution.95 For the fear to be considered ‘well-founded’ a person has to either have 
been a victim of persecution or must show good reason why he fears persecution.96 
Evidently, ‘well-founded fear of being persecuted’ does not require actual persecution 
to have taken place. The ordinary meaning of ‘fear’ implies that it is sufficient that the 
objector would be exposed to a risk of persecution that would materialize upon return. 
Yet, former harassment might be seen as a significant indicator that the objector 
might become a victim of persecution if he or she returns. Article 4(4) of the 
Qualification Directive has reaffirmed that previous persecution ‘is a serious 
indication’ of the applicant’s well-founded fear of persecution.  
 
According to UNHCR’s Handbook, ‘fear’ ‘contains both a subjective and an 
objective element’. 97  Accordingly, the fear must be ‘reasonable’, 98  a subjective 
assessment that must take into account the applicant’s personality.99 The credibility of 
the applicant’s fear must then be evaluated against objective information on the 
conditions in the country of origin. This duality is also present in the Guidelines on 
Military Service, which considers both the ‘personal experience of the applicant’ and 
‘experiences of others similarly situated’.100 Clearly, the UNHCR is sticking to its 
subjective-objective approach in relation to conscientious objection.  
 
Several scholars have been sceptical to this subjective-objective approach. They claim 
that it may lead to denial of refugee status because the applicant is not subjectively 
fearful, is not able to express his fear, or simply, because the decision-makers cannot 
identify the fear. 101  It is argued that proving the subjective element causes great 
practical challenges, and that in requiring it, the applicant could be denied protection 
despite a real risk of persecution.  
 
																																																								95	’Handbook’,	para.	42	96	Ad	Hoc	Committee	on	Statelessness	and	Related	Problems,	UN	Docs	E/1618	and	E/AC.32/5	(1950),	p.39	97	‘Handbook’,	para.	38	98Ibid.	para.	41	99Ibid.	para.	40	100	‘Guidelines	on	Military	Service’,	para.	13	101	See	e.g.	James	Hathaway	et.	al.,	The	Law	of	Refugee	Status,	2nd	ed.	(Cambridge:	Cambridge	University	Press,	2014),	96	and	Supra	note	27,	p.339	
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Hence, recent academic writings favour a purely objective approach.102 They often 
build on Grahl-Madsen who early on stated ‘the adjective ‘well-founded’ suggests 
that […] his claim should be measured with a more objective yardstick’.103 They 
further stress that this objective risk assessment in no way excludes taking the 
person’s individual situation into consideration, and note that this approach is already 
implemented by courts in France, New Zealand, Australia and the UK.  
 
In conclusion, despite the apparent development towards a more objective approach, 
the UNHCR in its 2013 Guidelines on Military Service choose to uphold its 
subjective-objective approach. The Qualification Directive does not further elaborate 
on its chosen approach.   
 
3.3  ‘for reasons of’  
 
Article 1(A)2 requires that the objector’s fear of being persecuted is linked to one or 
more of the five enumerated Convention grounds. This requirement entails that the 
persecution must have a discriminatory element – the persecution must be for reasons 
of ‘race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political 
opinion’. Furthermore, it centres the refugee definition around systematic violations 
by excluding arbitrary victims of war, violence etc.  
 
The need for such a restriction becomes clear when realizing that the global asylum 
capacity cannot accommodate all those who claim refuge based simply on the risk of 
serious harm. It has been claimed that the ‘for reasons of’-requirement in some 
jurisdictions has become the most important reason for denying refugee status.104 This 
has also been the case for some conscientious objectors. 
 
The ordinary meaning of ‘for reasons of’ implies that it is only those who can 
demonstrate the existence of a link between one of the five grounds and their flight 
that can be granted protection under the Refugee Convention.  																																																								102	Ibid.	103	Supra	note	27,	p.340		104	UNHCR,	Claims	for	Protection	Based	on	Religion	or	Belief:	Analysis	and	Proposed	Conclusions,	December	2002,	PPLA/2002/01,	p.	vii		
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There is an on-going debate about what is necessary in order to establish the required 
causal link. Due to the lack of interpretative guidance in article 1(A)2, courts have 
applied standards of causation from other areas of law inter alia the strict ‘but for’-
standard from tort law.105 Some scholars have adopted a so-called ‘contributing 
cause’-approach, stressing that ‘the Convention ground need not be the sole, or even 
the dominant cause of the risk of being persecuted. It need only be a contributing 
factor’ provided it is not ‘remote to the point of irrelevance’.106 The Guidelines on 
Military service have opted for this latter approach.107 
 
The Qualification Directive article 9(3) relaxes the requirements of causal nexus by 
simply requiring a ‘connection’, implying a lower threshold than the ‘contributing 
cause’-test applied by UNHCR. Legal scholars confirm that the ‘most appropriate 
understanding [of the Directive] seems to be that, while it is necessary for a 
‘connection’ to be established, this does not require […] a strict causal link’.108  
 
The different approaches to the nexus requirement have been particularly apparent in 
conscientious objection cases. U.S courts have interpreted ‘for reasons of’ to require 
proof of the prosecutor’s motivation in order to satisfy the nexus requirement. Canas-
Segovina clearly illustrates this. The court ruled that it was not persecution to punish a 
Jehovah’s Witness for refusing to perform military service, seeing as the 
government’s intent was to raise an army, not to persecute the applicant for his 
religion or belief.109 
 
The US’ approach has been broadly criticized for being overly formalistic on the 
grounds that the overall purpose of the Refugee Convention is to provide protection to 
those in need, not to identify the intention of the persecutor. The subjective 
motivation of the persecutor should not be the deciding factor in whether or not there 
exists a risk of being persecuted. The UNHCR has argued that this intent-standard 																																																								105	Supra	note	27,	p.372	106	University	of	Michigan	Law	School,	‘International	Refugee	Law:	The	Michigan	Guidelines	on	Nexus	to	a	Convention	Ground’,	Michigan	Journal	of	International	Law	23	(2002),	para.	13,	107	Para.	47	108	Steve	Peers,	ed.	EU	Immigration	and	Asylum	Law	Text	and	Commentary,	2nd	rev.	ed.,	Vol.	3,	(Leiden:	Brill	Nijhoff,	2012),	110	109	INS	v.	Canas-Segovia,	970	F.2d	599	(9th	Cir.	1992)	
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derived from criminal law is wrongly applied in refugee law. They stress that it is 
inappropriate and potentially dangerous to import notions from other areas of law that 
raise the applicant’s evidentiary burden.110  
 
The Guidelines on Military Service confirm that the persecutor’s intent is not 
decisive. Yet, they specify that the intent ‘can’ be a relevant factor in establishing the 
causal link between the objector’s fear of persecution and one of the convention 
grounds.111  
 
There is no indication in legal writings or case law that intent is a relevant factor in 
the Qualification Directive.  
 
In conclusion, the Refugee Convention and UNHCR’s Guidelines seemingly set out 
higher nexus-requirements than the Qualification Directive. 
 
3.4 A link to ‘political opinion’  
 
As ‘political opinion’ is the Convention ground most often applied by courts in 
relation to conscientious objection, the following presentation will be restricted to this 
ground (whilst still recognizing that both ‘religion’ and ‘membership of a particular 
social group’ could also be relevant grounds for conscientious objectors).  
 
Traditionally, questions of protection for deserters and draft-evaders have been linked 
to ‘political opinion’.112 Courts have ruled on a liberal interpretation of this term to 
include ‘any opinion or any matter in which machinery of state, government and 
policy may be engaged’.113 It is generally accepted that the term also covers an 
imputed political opinion.114  
 																																																								110‘UNHCR	intervention	before	the	House	of	Lords	in	the	case	of	Yasin	Sepet	and	Erdem	Bulbul	
(Appellants)	v.	the	Secretary	of	State	for	the	Home	Department	(Respondent)’,	8	January	2003,	para.	4.2-4.4	available	at:	http://www.refworld.org/docid/3e5ba7f02.html	[accessed	26	September	2015]	111	‘Guidelines	on	Military	Service’,	para.	48	112	Supra	note	8,	p.345	113	Attorney	General	v.	Ward	[1993]	2	S.C.R.	689,	p.34		114	Confirmed	in	paragraph	52	of	the	Guidelines	and	article	10(2)	of	the	Qualification	Directive.		
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It has long been agreed upon by legal scholars such as Hathaway, Sternberg and 
Goodwin-Gill that this is the most relevant category for conscientious objectors.  
Goodwin-Gill has proclaimed that ‘refusal to bear arms, however motivated, reflects 
an essentially political opinion regarding the permissible limits of State authority’.115 
He has even gone as far as to claim that the link to a Convention ground can only be 
through ‘political opinion’.116 Even though there could be political aspects to a claim 
of conscience, one might argue that ‘political opinion’ alone does not sufficiently 
address matters of conscience. 
 
The starting point is that objectors can be granted asylum through a link to ‘political 
opinion’. Still, adjudicators have often sought to limit the recognition of selective 
conscientious objectors through labelling claims of conscientious objection as 
‘political’ rather than a matter of conscience.   
 
A thorough review of relevant legal instruments has given no indication of grounds in 
international refugee law for differentiating between those who object to all military 
actions and those who object to specific wars, indicating that selective objectors 
should have an equal right to protection, as confirmed by Guidelines.117 
 
Still, opponents of selective objection are convinced that most of those who claim 
such status do not really object to the war in question on grounds of conscience but on 
grounds of politics. Hence, claims are categorized as ‘political’ in order to refuse 
protection to selective objectors. Hereby, adjudicators prevent the recognition of 
‘new’ rights, an argument often based in the fear of accommodating for a flow of 
claims for refugee status.  
 
The clearest example of this practice is US case law, where selective objectors have, 
more often than not, been denied protection. The argument is that selective objection 
is merely a political conviction related to that one war, hence it must be viewed as a 
political objection, not one of conscience. In Gillette, which concerned an American 
soldier who objected to the Vietnam War on grounds of ‘fundamental principles of 																																																								115	Supra	note	15,	p.111		116	Ibid.	p.	115	117	See	para.	8		
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conscience’,. the court bluntly rejected the legitimacy of selective objection, through 
characterizing it as ‘conscientious objection of indeterminate scope’.118 
 
This “misuse” of the Convention ground ‘political opinion’ to withhold protection for 
selective objectors is rendered possible by paragraph 171 of UNHCR’s Handbook, 
which places a limit on political justifications that can serve as basis for objection.119  
As will be illustrated below, selective objection seems to have been removed from the 
realm of conscience, instead relying on paragraph 171’s external assessment of the 
legality of military action. One clear example of this is Sepet where the Court of 
Appeal stated that to place the individual’s conscience over the legitimate interests of 
the state is a ‘political decision’.120 The refusal was later upheld by the House of 
Lords, which found that the one of the grounds for denying protection was that the 
applicants did not have a ‘rooted objection to all military service’.121  
 
To further understand this reasoning, it is important to acknowledge the role 
paragraph 171 of the Handbook has played in denying selective objectors status as 
refugees.  
 
3.4.1 The central role of paragraph 171 of the Handbook 
 
Seeing as the Handbook is meant to guide legal practitioners in applying the refugee 
definition, we must, like many have done before us, look to paragraph 171 when 
determining refugee status for conscientious objectors where claims are linked to 
‘political opinion’.  
 
To fully understand the status of conscientious objectors under the Refugee 
Convention, a thorough assessment of paragraph 171 of the Handbook is crucial. Its 
importance as a legal source becomes apparent through a review of central case law 
which all address paragraph 171.122 Sepet states that paragraph 170 ‘appears to be 																																																								118	Gillette	v	United	States,	401	U.S.	437	(1971),	para	437,439	119	Supra	note	8,	p.346		120	Yasin	Sepet,	Erdem	Bulbul	v.	Secretary	of	State	for	the	Home	Department,	C/2777;	C/2000/2794,	paras.	71	and	98	121	Supra	note	18,	para.	8		122	See	Sepet,	Supra	note	18,	Krotov,	Supra	note	127	and	Hinzman,	Supra	note	132	
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qualified by paragraph 171’,123 suggesting that 171 constitutes the basis for the 
assessment of whether or not the objector has a valid claim for protection. In the 
following it will be illustrated why this view is problematic.  
 
Paragraph 171 starts off by stating that, despite its genuineness, not every conviction 
will constitute a sufficient reason for claiming refugee status after desertion or draft 
evasion. Its reference to ‘political justification’ implies that the paragraph intends to 
serve as an interpretative guide relating to cases of conscientious objection that the 
courts link to a political opinion. It goes on to make the following statement:  
 
‘Where, however, the type of military action, with which an individual does not wish 
to be associated, is condemned by the international community as contrary to basic 
rules of human conduct, punishment for desertion or draft evasion could, in light of 
all other requirements of the definition, in itself be regarded as persecution.’  
 
To get an understanding of paragraph 171 it is essential to look closer at the 
conditions it sets out for conscientious objectors.  
 
3.4.1.1 ‘condemned by the international community’  
 
The ordinary meaning of ‘condemned by the international community’ suggests the 
need for some sort of public international disapproval. But what is the ‘international 
community’, and who speaks for it? Several cases, particularly from the US, have 
interpreted this to require a UN resolution condemning the military action,124 a 
requirement later rejected by national courts.  
 
Still, case law shows that traditionally, the threshold for ‘condemned by the 
international community’ has been set high. In Sepet the claims of two Kurdish 
asylum seekers analysed under paragraph 171 were denied on the basis of a failure to 
show international condemnation of Turkish military action against the Kurds. 
Similarly, the Norwegian Appeals Board rejected the application of a Russian 
																																																								123	Supra	note	18,	para	12	124	See	i.e.	M.A	v	INS,	899	F.2d	304,	313	(4th	Circ.	1990)	
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selective objector on grounds that the Russian military action in Chechnya had neither 
been condemned by the international community, nor by the Norwegian state.125  
 
The problem with promoting ‘international condemnation’ as a condition for 
protection for conscientious objectors is that the decision to voice such condemnation 
is often coloured by diplomatic and economic considerations. National governments 
are hesitant to adopt condemnatory language in fear of affecting their bilateral 
relations. Because statements are often made in private meetings it has been 
questioned whether it is appropriate to expect an asylum determination to be 
contingent on the non-condemnatory language used by diplomats.126 Relying on a 
condemnation that is dependent on political influence may therefore set an improper 
threshold for conscientious objectors.  
 
However, in recent developments in Krotov, the requirement of explicit international 
condemnation was seemingly abandoned. The Court concluded that instead of official 
announcements, it should be determined whether or not the military action was 
systematically in contradiction with core humanitarian norms, drawing on inter alia 
findings of reports by NGOs and the Human Rights Council.127 The New Zealand 
Refugee Status Appeals Authority (RSAA) followed up this view by stressing that  
‘what is happening on the ground as to observance of the laws of war by parties to the 
conflict is key’.128 Still, the RSAA points out that condemnation by an international 
body would ‘be relevant to the inquiry’.  
 
In conclusion, recent case law suggests that explicit condemnation is not a mandatory, 
but a relevant factor within the meaning of para. 171. This view is supported by the 
Guidelines on Military Service. They proclaim that in determining the legality of a 
conflict ‘condemnation by the international community is strong evidence, but not 
essential for finding that the use of force is in violation of international law’.129  
 
																																																								125	Supra	note	8,	p.356	126	Ibid.		127	Krotov	v.	Secretary	of	State	for	the	Home	Department	[2004]	1	WLR	1825	[2004]	EWCA	Civ	69,	para	16,	26	128	RSAA,	Refugee	Appeal	No.	73578,	19	Oct.	2005,	para.	87.		129	Para.	24		
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This shift away from requiring international condemnation is mirrored in the 
Qualification Directive, which makes no mention of condemnation as a relevant 
factor. Instead, the Directive views the military action in light of a humanitarian law 
and human rights framework, evidently shifting the focus from the political 
characterization that comes with a condemnation and over to emphasized focus on 
international legal standards.  
 
3.4.1.2 ‘type of military action… contrary to basic rules of human conduct’ 
 
In times of armed conflict there are primarily two concepts of international law that 
are applicable: jus ad bellum relates to the rules on legality of the use of force as set 
forth in the UN Charter, while jus in bello regulates the means and methods of 
warfare. Liability for violations of jus ad bellum is usually attached to high-ranking 
members of the government or military, while both soldiers and civilians may be held 
liable for violations of jus in bello (commonly known as ‘war crimes’). This 
distinction has been of significance when determining whether a conscientious 
objector has acted contrary to ‘basic rules of human conduct’, the reason being that 
there has been a reluctance to consider evidence of violations of jus ad bellum as 
relevant for determining refugee status.  
 
A question therefor arises as to whether jus ad bellum is relevant in the objector’s 
claim for protection.   
 
Reading the Handbook alone it is unclear whether these “basic rules of human 
conduct” include both jus in bello and jus ad bellum. However, the more recent 
Guidelines have confirmed that the term refers to both concepts.130 Despite this 
recognition of jus ad bellum, case law has suggested that only higher-level 
commanders can base their claims for protection in violations of jus ad bellum.  
 
The issue was raised in Hinzman, which concerned an American soldier who had 
deserted the U.S Army upon deployment to Iraq due to strong moral objections to the 
war. He believed that the American-led military action in the country was illegal 																																																								130	Para.	21	
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according to international standards, indicating a conviction based on violations of jus 
ad bellum. When filing for asylum in Canada, he argued that it would place too heavy 
a burden on him to also have to demonstrate his involvement in a war crime.  
 
The Immigration and Refugee Board ruled that violations of jus ad bellum were ‘not 
relevant’ in determining acts “contrary to basic rules of human conduct”.131 Upon 
judicial review, the Federal Court expressed that ‘the question of whether the 
American-led military intervention in Iraq is in fact illegal is not before the court’.132 
Seeing as violations of jus ad bellum had been described as ‘leadership crimes’, it was 
only those with the power to plan, prepare, initiate and wage wars that were 
culpable.133 As a ‘mere foot soldier’, Hinzman ‘could not be held to account for any 
breach of international law committed by the United States’. Only ‘on the ground 
activities’ which he would have been associated with were relevant with regards to 
paragraph 171.134 Because Hinzman as a soldier could not be held complicit in crimes 
against peace, the Court concluded that the assessment related to violations of jus in 
bello and not jus ad bellum. When he could not demonstrate his involvement in a war 
crime his appeal was rejected. 
 
This decision has been characterized as discriminatory seeing as it prevents 
“ordinary” soldiers from claiming conscientious objection grounded in jus ad 
bellum.135 Furthermore, Bailliet notes that it is unfortunate that the standard of proof 
for conscientious objection is raised through questioning liability under international 
criminal law – a conscientious objector may hold himself morally responsible for his 
actions, regardless of whether or not he may be liable for them under international 
law.136  
 
The Guidelines on Military Service seemingly reject the view that only high-level 
commanders can base their claims in jus ad bellum. They stress that in a conflict 
considered to be in violation of jus ad bellum, it is not necessary that the applicant is 																																																								131	Hinzman	v	Immigration	and	Refugee	Board,	File	TA4-01429,	Immigration	and	Refugee	Board	of	Canada	(16	March	2005)	para.	10	132	Hinzman	v.	Canada	(Minister	of	Citizenship	and	Immigration)	2006	FC	420,	para.5		133	Ibid.	para	142	134	Ibid.	para.	188	135	Supra	note	8,	p.373		136	Ibid.	
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‘at risk of incurring individual criminal responsibility’.137 Evidently, the Guidelines 
lower the threshold on this point, allowing all soldiers, regardless of rank, to claim 
conscientious objection grounded in jus ad bellum.  
 
In referencing the exclusion clause in article 12(2), which mentions both ‘war crimes’ 
and ‘crimes against peace’ the Qualification Directive makes it clear that both 
violations of jus in bello and jus ad bellum can give grounds for protection. 
 
The Directive does not explicitly state whether it follows the Hinzman-case in 
excluding those in a lower position of authority from basing their claims in violations 
of jus ad bellum. To find the answer, we must look to the latest developments 
regarding the content and interpretation of article 9(2)(e) in Shepherd, a preliminary 
ruling in the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) from February 2015.138  
The case concerned an American soldier trained as a helicopter maintenance 
mechanic. He left the army upon being ordered to Iraq on grounds that he considered 
the war to be illegal. Shepherd applied for asylum in Germany claiming that in 
refusing to perform military service he risked criminal prosecution in the US. The 
German Court requested a preliminary ruling on the interpretation of inter alia article 
9(2)(e) of the 2004 Qualification Directive. The CJEU states in relation to violations 
of jus in bello that in adopting article 9(2)(e) the EU ‘did not mean to restrict its scope 
to certain personnel […] on the basis, inter alia, of their rank in the military 
hierarchy’. It further states that article 9(2)(e) covers ‘all military personnel, including 
therefore, logistical or support staff’.139 Despite coming as a response to a question 
related to jus in bello, the fact that the Court confirms that article 9(2)(e) covers “all 
military personnel” must be interpreted to mean that also those in a lower position in 
the military can base claims for protection in violations of jus ad bellum.  
 
It is the prevailing view today that interpretations in preliminary rulings bind the 
national courts of all EU Member States. 140  As a result, it appears as if the 
Qualification Directive and the Guidelines now coincide in relation to jus ad bellum.  
 																																																								137	Para.	23	138	Andre	Lawrence	Shepherd	v	Bundesrepublik	Deutschland,	C‑472/13,	[2015]	139	Ibid.	para.	33	140	See	Kühne	and	Heitz	v	Productschap	voor	Pluimvee	en	Eieren,	C-435/00,	[2004]	paras.	21-27	
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Upon closer examination of Shepherd it seems as though the CJEU, through its 
interpretation of article 9(2)(e), further raises the threshold for protection in relation to 
violations of jus in bello. 
 
The CJEU implies a need for Shepherd to establish that performing military service 
would include crimes or acts falling under the exclusion clause. The CJEU holds it 
possible that war crimes were committed. However, quite alarmingly, it goes on to 
say that ‘an armed intervention engaged upon on the basis of a resolution adopted by 
the Security Council offers, in principle, every guarantee that no war crimes will be 
committed’ and that the same applies ‘to an operation which gives rise to an 
international consensus’.141 It appears as if the Court suggests that when there is 
international consensus, there is a very limited possibility for war crimes, an 
implication that clearly raises the bar and gives a limited possibility for protection on 
grounds of article 9(2)(e). Much like in the Handbook paragraph 171 we see a 
tendency of shifting focus away from a case-by-case assessment, instead relying on 
the international community’s opinions, which are often heavily influenced by 
politics.  
 
In my opinion, regardless of these recent clarifications, it is clear that both jus in bello 
and jus ad bellum are relevant in the assessment of conscientious objection. The 
ordinary meaning of ‘human conduct’ may seemingly relate more closely to jus in 
bello, which specifically concerns the conduct of the parties engaged in a conflict. 
However, in light of the object and purpose of refugee law to protect the refugee, this 
wording should not be interpreted to exclude claims based in jus ad bellum. There is 
no reason to conclude that a person that would otherwise be prepared to bear arms 
cannot be of the belief that it would go against his conscience to fight in a war that is 
a violation of jus ad bellum. The fact that these violations are normally attributed to 
state or military leaders should not restrict conscientious objectors of all ranks from 
basing their claims in violations of jus ad bellum. Furthermore, the CJEU’s 
implication that no war crimes will be committed when an operation is supported by 
international consensus, in my opinion, shows an alarming naivety regarding the 
conduct in armed conflicts.  																																																								141	Shepherd,	para.	41	
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3.4.1.3 Is proof of personal and/or direct participation in the military action 
required?  
 
A question that arises in continuation of this is to what degree the conscientious 
objector would be required to participate in such “inhumane” acts, and furthermore, 
what standard of proof is to be applied, if any.  
 
The wording of 171 does not in its ordinary meaning require proof of personal or 
direct participation. On the contrary it only demands that the applicant ‘does not wish 
to be associated with’ the acts in question. Unfortunately, adjudicators appear to have 
misinterpreted this term to require examination of the likelihood of participation in 
atrocities.142 
 
The Norwegian Immigration Appeals Board rejected the application of a group of 
Israeli soldiers due to lack of proof of a ‘real risk’ of participation in actions that 
violated international law.143 In Sepet, this burden of proof is lowered to ‘might 
require’,144 whilst Krotov attempts to offer a concrete test by asking whether soldiers 
‘may be required on a sufficiently widespread basis’ to act in contradiction with 
humanitarian norms.145  
 
Applying a high burden of proof would go against the purpose of refugee law - to 
provide protection to those with a well-founded fear of persecution. In addition, when 
acknowledging that violations of international norms more often than not is a direct 
cause to the flow of refugees, this should be reason enough to favour those who do 
not wish to partake in such acts, instead of raising the bar.   
 
Notwithstanding, the Guidelines require a ‘reasonable likelihood’ of participation in 
violations of international law, a threshold distinctly higher than in Sepet and 
																																																								142	That	the	term	‘associated’	does	not	require	actual	or	likely	participation	was	confirmed	in	Key	
v	Canada	(Minister	of	Citizenship	and	Immigration)	2008	FC	383,	para.	21	143	Supra	note	27,	p.433		144	Sepet,	para.	8		145	Krotov,	para.	51
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Krotov.146 In determining whether such ‘reasonable likelihood’ exists, ‘the extent to 
which breaches of basic rules of human conduct occur in the conflict’ is relevant, a 
condition much reflecting ‘widespread basis’ in Krotov. It is evident that a certain 
level of proof of personal participation is required by the Guidelines, despite the 
wording in paragraph 171 making no such requirement.  
 
Shepherd confirms a similarity to the Guidelines when applying ‘reasonably 
plausibly’ as the relevant standard. The Court further stresses that article 9(2)(e) does 
not refer solely to the situation in which the applicant would be led to commit war 
crimes ‘personally’. Situations where the applicant would participate only ‘indirectly’ 
are not ‘as a matter of principle, excluded’. Still protection can only be extended to 
those persons whose tasks could ‘sufficiently directly’ lead them to participate in war 
crimes.147 The Guidelines confirm that in a more indirect participation, a claim of 
persecution is unlikely to arise without ‘additional factors’, hereunder the link 
between the applicants role and ‘foreseeability of or contributions to’ the violations of 
international law.148 
 
In regards to setting requirements for personal and direct participation, the two 
instruments seem quite similar. But the Guidelines go on to recognize that ‘the 
applicant’s reasons for objecting – regardless of the foreseeability or remoteness of 
the commissions of crimes linked to his or her activities – may be sufficient to qualify 
him or her as a conscientious objector’. 149  In other words, the Guidelines 
acknowledge the conscience of the applicant as a factor that can be decisive in the 
claim for protection for those serving indirectly. Here we can clearly see the 
consequence of the lack of recognition of the applicant’s conscience in the 
Qualification Directive.   
 
In conclusion in relation to conscientious objectors and ‘political opinion’ as the 
chosen convention ground it is apparent that through concluding that the high 
standards set forth in paragraph 171 are not met, several courts have rejected claims 
of selective objectors especially. By linking the objection to a political opinion and an 																																																								146	Guidelines,	para.	26		147	See	paras.	36-38	148	Para.	29	149	Ibid.		
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external assessment regarding the international community’s perspective of military 
action, the focus is shifted away from the convictions and sincerely held beliefs of the 
objector. One might question whether adjudicators place too much weight in the 
conditions set out in paragraph 171, as they are only meant as an interpretative guide 
to article 1A(2).  
 
3.5 Conclusion  	
It is clear that both the Qualification Directive and UNHCR’s recommendations 
provide essential interpretative guidance to the refugee definition in cases of 
conscientious objection.  
 
Still it is evident that freedom of conscience could be given a more restrictive scope in 
the European context as Bayatyan opened for limiting this right, enabling a higher 
threshold for persecution. On the other hand, the Qualification Directive presents a 
less strict nexus requirement than the UNHCR, a softening-up favourable to the 
conscientious objector. 
 
Even though a requirement of an international condemnation was rejected in Krotov, 
the Guidelines maintain that such condemnation is strong evidence of a violation of 
international law. The Qualification Directive makes no mention of this as a relevant 
factor, indicating a lower threshold for protection. Still it is clear that the Directive 
maintains a strong connection to political statements when implying in Shepherd that 
in principle no war crimes will be committed when there is international consensus on 
the armed intervention in question. This binding interpretation of article 9(2)(e) can 
deprive the conscientious objector of the violation of international law, on which he 
depends when seeking protection.  
 
Finally, in setting the standard of proof for participation too high, as might be said for 
the Guidelines and Qualification Directive, we risk severely narrowing the scope of 
protection. Both instruments recognize indirect participation as relevant, but it is only 
the Guidelines that acknowledge the conscience of those serving more indirectly.  In a 
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hypothetical case where the Guidelines had been applied instead of the Directive, the 
outcome in Shepherd might have been different.    	
4  Discussion   
 
In order to come to a conclusion on the discrepancies between the instruments subject 
to analysis in this thesis and furthermore the circumstances under which a 
conscientious objector can be granted protection, there are two issues that need to be 
raised.   
 
4.1 To what extent does the Handbook actually recognize conscientious 
objection?   
 
As shown in section 3.4.1, case law clearly favours citing paragraph 171 in questions 
of conscientious objection. Yet, this paragraph makes no mention of refusal to serve 
for reasons of conscience. It is paragraph 170 that opens for protection where 
‘performance of military service would have required […] participation in military 
action contrary to […] valid reasons of conscience’.  
 
Whether or not paragraph 170 is to be viewed as an independent ground for protection 
comes across as rather unclear in legal writings and case law. Scholars often seem 
content with quoting paragraph 170 without further discussions on its status. Despite 
pointing out paragraph 170 as ‘the most helpful to the applicants’, Sepet concludes 
that this paragraph ‘appears to be qualified by paragraph 171’.150 Further indicating its 
dependence on paragraph 171 is Hinzman. The Court expressed that bringing oneself 
within paragraph 170 was not enough to entitle someone to protection, as it had to be 
read in conjunction with para 171.151 
 
In a contextual interpretation, choosing the phrase ‘There are, however, also cases’ to 
introduce paragraph 170 may be seen as a retrospect to paragraph 169, (opening for 																																																								150	See	para.	12	151	See	paras.	107-109		
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protection in cases of disproportionately severe punishment), indicating that 
paragraph 170 could also serve as an independent basis. In addition, paragraph 174 
provides that ‘the genuineness of a person’s […] reasons of conscience […] will of 
course need to be established by a thorough investigation of his personality and 
background’, suggesting that the drafters of the Handbook had envisaged an 
independent internal assessment of the objector’s conscience after paragraph 170.  
When paragraph 170 states that it ‘may be the sole ground for a claim for refugee 
status’, it is difficult to come to the conclusion that the drafters of the Handbook have 
meant for paragraph 170 to be qualified by paragraph 171. Unfortunately, there are no 
available records of the drafters’ intentions.   
 
So why then do cases like Sepet deny the objectors protection on the grounds that the 
standards in 171 are not met, and despite finding ‘strong and sincere’ convictions with 
the applicants,152 seemingly reject paragraph 170 as an independent ground for 
protection?  
 
The lack of discussion around the interrelationship between paragraph 170 and 171 is 
concerning. While the wording in the Handbook clearly suggests the possibility of 
paragraph 170 being an independent ground for protection, case law suggests 
otherwise. The consequences of relying on paragraph 171 are clearly reflected in the 
refusal to offer protection to selective objectors, removing the objection from the 
realm of conscience. It can be argued that only by viewing paragraph 170 as an 
independent ground we achieve the internal assessment of conscience that paragraph 
174 enables.    
 
4.2 A critical view on the drafting of the Qualification Directive  
 
Before concluding on the discrepancies, it is of interest to note that the Qualification 
Directive could have presented a different approach to conscientious objection than it 
does today.   
 
																																																								152	See	para.	8		
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Cecilia Bailliet notes that the developments within the EU regarding conscientious 
objection displays a type of ‘schizophrenia’.153 
 
When the European Commission first issued a proposal for the Directive in 2001154 it 
encompassed protection where performance in military service would require 
participation in activities that were ‘irreconcilable with the applicants […] valid 
reasons of conscience’.155 It did not require acts to fall under the exclusion clause, as 
is the case in article 9(2)(e) today.    
 
In reading the Commission’s Explanatory Memorandum, it is obvious that they were 
greatly inspired by paragraph 170 and 171 of the Handbook.156 More importantly, the 
Commission expressed that incompatibility with general international norms was ‘not 
indispensable’ and that ‘even if the military action is generally conducted within the 
limits prescribed by the laws of war, the person may have valid reasons of conscience 
for not participating in it’. Through this they indicated that an individual’s conscience 
can give grounds for protection, regardless of violations of international law. 
 
Clearly, this proposal was not retained in the Directive adopted in 2004. A thorough 
examination of the procedure from the Commission’s proposal up to the Council 
Directive has given no further answers as to why the original proposal was 
abandoned. On the contrary, what is clear is that the Council shifted the focus 
exclusively over to acts contrary to international law, excluding the recognition of 
‘valid reasons of conscience’.  
 
Despite being criticized by both UNHCR and ECRE as running counter to the 
standards within UNCHR’s Handbook and evolving human rights law, 157  the 
Commission made no attempt at including ‘valid reasons of conscience’ in the 2011-
recast. A possible change of article 9(2)(e) was never mentioned in the recast-
proposal, despite the Commission characterising the 2004-Directive as ‘vague and 
																																																								153	Supra	note	8,	p.367	154	COM(2002)	510	final	–	2001/0207(CNS)	155	Ibid.	art.11(1)(d)	156	Official	Journal	051	E,	26/02/2002	p.	0325	–	0334		157	See	UNHCR	Annotated	Comments	on	the	EC	Council	Directive	2004/83/EC	of	29	April	2004,	28	January	2005,	and	ECRE	Information	Note	on	the	Council	Directive	2004/83/EC	of	29	April	2004.		
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ambiguous’ and ‘insufficient to secure full compatibility with the evolving human 
rights and refugee law standards’.158 With this as a backdrop it is surprising that the 
Commission, in light of the development towards recognizing conscientious objection 
as a human right, once more rejected ‘valid reasons of conscience’ in the 2011-recast.  
 
4.3 Conclusion  
 
Through the multiple rejections of ‘valid reasons of conscience’ the EU Member 
States decided to limit protection for conscientious objectors, and hence have 
intentionally refrained from broadening their interpretation of the Refugee 
Convention to include objections based in valid reasons of conscience.  Having taken 
such a firm stand on the issue could indicate a lack of willingness to abandon this 
restrictive position in the future.  
 
It is clear that if we are to follow case law on the interrelationship between paragraph 
170 and 171 of the Handbook, the discrepancies between the Handbook and the 
Qualification Directive are seemingly less, seeing as both paragraph 171 and article 
9(2)(e) set a high threshold for conscientious objectors through relying on external 
assessments.  
 
Common for both these issues is that, despite thorough research, it has not been 
possible to uncover the intentions of the drafters of the two instruments.  
 
5 Conclusion  	
This thesis presented the following research question: ‘under what circumstances may 
conscientious objection to military service be a ground for refugee status?’ 
 
																																																								158Supra	note	63,	p.3	
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Considering the discrepancies in the instruments regulating conscientious objection in 
international refugee law it has proved challenging to provide a conclusive answer to 
this question, as presupposed.    
 
It has been established that the Qualification Directive is given a more restrictive 
scope than the UNHCR’s Handbook and Guidelines by linking the relevant military 
actions to the exclusion grounds and abandoning valid reasons of conscience as 
grounds for protection. A major concern with this approach is that a soldier’s 
conscience may yet be affected at a threshold which is lower than that required for 
prosecution of a war crime. In connection with this finding it is worth stressing that in 
theory article 9(2)(e) does not contradict with the Refugee Convention in leaving out 
valid reasons of conscience as grounds for protection. In principle, as the list of acts 
of persecution is non-exhaustive, nothing stands in the way of including convictions 
of conscience in the Qualification Directive. But as illustrated in Shepherd, not 
explicitly including this aspect in 9(2)(e) may cause not only uncertainty, but also 
great variations in practice.  
 
With case law indicating that paragraph 170 cannot function as the sole ground for 
protection, the actual degree of discrepancy between the instruments meant to provide 
interpretative guidance to article 1(A)2 is less than it would have been if ‘valid 
reasons of conscience’ was confirmed as an independent basis for protection in the 
Handbook. Until case law or legal writings further discuss this interrelationship, it is 
difficult to conclude on the degree of discrepancy.   
 
In an attempt to provide interpretative guidance to the refugee definition in article 
1(A)2 for cases of conscientious objection, it becomes apparent through exploring 
case law that the UNHCR’s recommendations as well as the Qualification Directive 
rely on assessments of external factors, moving the focus of the claim away from the 
conscience of the individual objector.  
 
This thesis has, as most commonly done in legal writings and case law, treated 
conscientious objection with a link to ‘political opinion’. This link has entailed that 
selective objectors particularly have to overcome significant obstacles when claiming 
protection. And perhaps this is where the root of the problem lies – through placing a 
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limit on which political justifications can serve as basis for objection through 
applying the conditions in paragraph 171 of the Handbook, the adjudicator moves the 
focus away from the objector’s conscience and over to an external assessment. His 
reasons for doing so might not seem surprising when recognizing that from a practical 
view it takes less of an effort to reject the claim based on an external assessment of 
the international community’s view on the military action than to conduct an internal 
assessment of the objector’s conscience. In rejecting the claim the adjudicator also 
avoids taking a public stand on whether the applicant’s country of origin is violating 
international law, a rather politically sensitive statement.   
 
Still, it may be argued that only through an internal assessment can matters of 
conscience as grounds for refugee status be addressed successfully.  In a de lege 
ferenda perspective, adjudicators should therefore be less hesitant to recognize 
conscientious objections as claims of ‘religion’ or ‘membership of a particular social 
group’, both opening for an internal assessment of the objector.  
 
In practice, it may prove a challenge to assess the truth of a claimant’s statement of 
conscience. For courts to be able and willing to take on such an internal assessment, 
there seems to be a need for a clear and simple procedure for ascertaining valid 
reasons of conscience. One possibility, if applying ‘political opinion’ as the relevant 
Convention ground, could be to attempt to distinguish between civil disobedience 
done publicly and aimed at changing a law or policy, and conscientious objection 
undertaken more or less privately as an expression of moral convictions, as suggested 
by legal philosopher Joseph Raz.159 In any case, the central focus of the assessment 
should be the conscience of the individual objector.  
 
The two most recent instruments intended to provide guidance on protection for 
conscientious objectors have both been criticized by reputable scholars in 
international refugee law – the Guidelines on Military Service for lacking 
universality, and the Qualification Directive for running counter to the standards of 
the UNHCR’s recommendations and evolving human rights law. In addition, the lack 																																																								159Joseph	Raz,	The	authority	of	law:	Essays	on	law	and	morality,	(Oxford:		Clarendon	Press,	1979),	276	
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of unequivocal acceptance of the authoritative weight of UNHCR’s recommendations 
may, as shown in section 2, affect the adjudicator’s willingness to apply these 
instruments.  
 
As this thesis sought out to expose, there is a lack of harmonization between the 
instruments regulating conscientious objection. A clear sign of this is the absence of 
cross-referencing between the instruments. It has been suggested that further 
harmonization could be achieved by giving the UNHCR an expert role before the 
CJEU, allowing the UNHCR to present arguments for an interpretation of EU rules in 
light of the rules of international refugee law including UNHCR’s own 
recommendations.160   
 
Only through a more active and concurrent use, preferably addressing more than one 
of the instruments subject to analysis in this thesis at a time, can we get a clearer 
answer to under what circumstances conscientious objection to military service may 
be a ground for refugee status.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
																																																								160	Roland	Bank,	‘The	Potential	and	Limitations	of	the	Court	of	Justice	of	the	European	Union	in	Shaping	International	Refugee	Law’,	International	Journal	of	Refugee	Law	27(2015),	243	
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